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    In the field of memory, there has recently been an upsurge of interest in narrative accounts of personality and identity.  These approaches suggest that personality is supported by the construction of life stories, based on autobiographical memory (e.g. McAdams, Bauer, Sakaeda, et al., 2006).  Autobiographical memory (AM) is memory for the events that occur in one’s life (Conway & Rubin, 1993) and is closely linked to our life goals, our emotions and our personal meanings. Our very sense of identity depends on being able to recall personal history (self defining memories, Moffitt & Singer, 1994), and in order to explore self and identity, there needs to be an understanding of encoding and retrieval of event specific temporal knowledge (e.g. Skowronski et al., 2007). For a review of the complex relationship between Self and Memory, see Conway (2005).  One of the well-established findings in AM research is that the distribution of memories is not equal across the lifespan, paralleling changes in the self and goals over time.  Undoubtedly the self changes over the course of childhood, and perhaps only stabilises into an enduring form in late adolescence and early adulthood (Erikson, 1950; Waterman, 1999; Schwartz, 2006).  
    A prominent theory is that these periods of development of the self and personality are reflected in the lifespan retrieval curve, which is observed when adults (aged about 35 and above) recall autobiographical memories from their life (e.g. Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986).  The lifespan retrieval curve consists of three components: the period of childhood amnesia, (from birth to approximately five years of age), the period of the reminiscence bump (from 10 to 30 years), and the period of recency (from the present declining back to the period of the reminiscence bump).   Of particular interest to those studying the relationship between the self and memory is the reminiscence bump, since this is the period of life from which, in a free recall task, people produce the most memories.  Crucially, the reminiscence bump is robustly based on the age of the rememberer at the time of encoding, and not the age of the memories, rejecting artefactual retrieval based accounts of this finding (Rubin et al., 1986). 
    There are two plausible explanations for the high level of memories from the reminiscence bump period.  One broadly cognitive theory is that this period is permeated by novel experiences and it is the novelty, preserved in some way in memory, of these experiences that ensures their enduring memorability.  In support of this theory, Cohen and Faulkner (1988) found 93% of vivid life memories were of either first-time experiences or unique events.  Similarly, Pillemer, Goldsmith, Panter and White (1988) observed high memorability of first time experiences with 41% of participants’ memories for their first year at college coming from the first month of their course.
    Somewhat counter to this proposal is the finding that, of the experiences recalled from the period of the reminiscence bump, only a small proportion are of novel events. Fitzgerald (1988) found little evidence that experiences recalled in the period of the reminiscence bump were novel events, the majority being events distinctive to the life circumstances and personal interests of the participant. For example, the memories tend to focus upon events concerning relationships, family, work and education (Elnick, Margrett, Fitzgerald & Labouvie-Vief, 1999).  Such inconsistencies in research based on the novelty account have led to the development of an alternative hypothesis, which is that the high accessibility of memories from this period may be related to their enduring relation to the self.  Possibly, many memories from the period of the reminiscence bump are of “self defining” experiences (Singer & Salovey, 1993) and have a powerful effect in binding the self to a specific reality.  This alternative view suggests that it is the self function of the reminiscence bump that ensures that most memories are generated from this period.  Thus, the reminiscence bump relates to a time in an individual’s life that is critical for the formation and maintenance of a stable self (e.g. Rubin et al., 1998).  In support of this idea, Conway and Haque (1999) showed similar accessibility of autobiographical memories from a period outside the reminiscence bump- a product of the ‘privileged encoding’ of experiences that are particularly relevant to the self. A group of older Bangladeshi participants showed a second reminiscence bump in the period of 35 to 55 years of age, coinciding with a period of national conflict in Bangladesh. This data suggests that the formation of a collection of new self images can result in the heightened retrieval of memories from that time, further demonstrating the relation between high accessibility of memories and autobiographical memory’s enduring link with the self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In addition, reminiscence bumps have been found for age of encountering favourite films (Sehulster, 1996), songs (Holbrook and Schindler, 1989) and books (Larsen, 1996). Janssen et al. (2007) directly compared distributions of first encounters with favourite books, films and records and found reminiscence bumps for all three. Results were suggested to partially reflect increased rehearsal of favourite items. In addition, such items were thought to have been encoded more strongly as a result of being encountered in adolescence, when memories relevant to self formation are best encoded. 
    The self is not envisaged as a unitary structure, rather it is the combination of many self-schemata, including cognitive representations developed from specific autobiographical events, as well as general representations such as ‘I am a mother’ (Markus, 1977). Amongst these many types of self-schemata are the selves that are activated at a given moment, dependent on the contextual cues present. Context has been shown to have a marked effect on the types of self-concepts generated (e.g. a female in an all male room is more likely to use the frame of gender in a self-description; see McGuire and Padawer-Singer, 1976). Markus and Kunda (1986) defined this active identity as the working self-concept. This term has more recently been developed by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) as the ‘working self’; a control structure that combines episodic memories with autobiographical knowledge in autobiographical memory formation. The working self consists of self concepts, goal hierarchies and other forms of self knowledge, and may function to exercise inhibitory control over the knowledge base (Conway, Singer & Tagini, 2004). The working self and its link to autobiographical memory changes over childhood, but, it was suggested, stabilises in late adolescence and early adulthood, as would be supported by the presence of a reminiscence bump in memory age distributions.  It is therefore possible that the key to the reminiscence bump lies in the theory that memories from this time are of ‘self-defining’ experiences (Fitzgerald, 1988; Singer & Salovey, 1993).
    Self-defining memories are a specific type of autobiographical memory with the characteristics of being linked to other memories, being vivid, high in emotionality, regularly repeated, and connected to an enduring theme or unresolved conflict. According to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), when goal pursuit is smooth, the working self’s relationship to the episodic memory system and autobiographical memories from the long-term self is inhibitory. When there is a change in goal status however, the working self becomes excitatory, there is affective arousal, and a retrieval mode functions to cue elaboration and activate autobiographical memories. We suggest that within this framework, self-defining memory activation will occur if the affective arousal is sufficient, and the goal change presents a cue match, combined with the goal being developmentally relevant. The activated self-defining memory creates a type of mental stimulation that combines motivational, cognitive and affective information, as well as forming a personal script containing goal-affect-outcome sequences (see also Conway, Singer & Tagini, 2002).
    Recent research, then, suggests that the function of the reminiscence bump is to ground the individual’s self; and that this part of the retrieval curve is involved in storing memories germane to identity formation and highly self-relevant experiences (Conway & Haque, 1999).  According to this view, as with the Bangladeshi participants, at any point where there is material relevant for self goals and self identity, there should be heightened accessibility of autobiographical memory, accompanying the formation of a self defining memory.  This is the focus of the current paper, an examination of the relationship between emergent selves and memory formation. Thus the primary purpose of the studies described below was to examine the distribution of autobiographical memories around times of identity formation.  
Study 1
    Whilst some research has measured self-knowledge and memory (see Gramzow, Gaertner & Sedikides, 2001), Addis and Tippet (2004), to our knowledge, were the first to use measures of memory function alongside the Twenty Statements Test (TST) empirical measure of the self (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954).  This task rests on the long sociological literature on the self, and is based on the fact that each individual will have numerous and multifarious selves – and that these ‘self images’ can be collected through self report (e.g. Madson & Trafimow, 2001).  Their basic task, often called the twenty statements test, requires participants to generate twenty self concepts that begin as ‘I am…’ This empirical tool enables the collection of a number of important, self-defining concepts and roles.  
    The novel focus of this paper however, was to collect some self defining memories associated to these self concepts and roles, referred to as self images.  In particular, we argued that each self image, e.g. I am quick tempered, should be associated with a set of accessible and relevant memories: a memory of upsetting a colleague at a former institution, and a memory of throwing yoghurt over a schoolmate in a dispute, for example.  In essence, each self image, regardless of age of onset, should have an associated reminiscence bump.  This is not unlike the finding that patients with dissociative identity disorder have been shown to have separate sets of autobiographical memories for each personality (Bryant, 1995).  The role of the working self, therefore, would be to activate these sets of self-defining memories within each self concept.  We argue that because the self images gathered in the twenty-statements reflect enduring and important aspects of the self, there should be a set of memories supporting those ideas, formed at the time the individual judges that that self emerged.
Method
    Participants
    There were 16 participants (11 female) of mean age 54.6 years (range: 47 to 66).  All were community dwelling and self reported themselves to be in good health, and without memory impairment.
    Materials and Procedure
    Participants were sent a test booklet, which they completed individually, at a time of their choosing within a two-week period.  The booklet had three sections. In section one, participants were asked for their date of birth, current age in years and months, and gender. In section two, they were asked to write down 10 enduring ‘I am…’ statements that they felt ‘defined their identity,’ a variation of the widely used Twenty-Statements-Test, or TST (Cousins, 1989; Gordon, 1968; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). In section three, three of these statements were then selected by the participant as “most personally significant to [their] sense of identity,” and which it was possible for them to recall memories for.  These three self concepts (labelled A, B and C) were then used to each generate 10 memories (A1 to A10, B1 to B10 and C1 to C10), as the participant recalled times in their life for each statement (eg. ‘I am a wife’) when they felt it was a significant part of their identity (e.g. ‘my wedding day’). Participants were asked to give a title and brief description, along with the age they were when the remembered event occurred.  They also reported the age at which they felt each of the three statements became a ‘defining part of their identity.’  This question was placed at the end of each of the sections A, B and C, so as not to affect the participants’ recall for the 10 described memories in each section. 
    Results and Discussion
(Insert Figure 1 About Here)
    In total, 480 detailed memories were collected, with all 16 participants providing 10 memories for each of their three identity statements.  The ‘I am’ statements had a mean age at acquisition of 22.9 years (SD = 13.2), referred to here as the critical age.  Each memory was dated by the participants by giving their age when the event occurred.  Figure 1 (upper panel) shows the distribution of all memories across the lifespan. Although Figure 1 demonstrates the typical period of childhood amnesia, it does not show the normal reminiscence bump of increased memory generation between the ages of 10 to 30 (which we would not expect in this case, since the memories are cued by selves, rather than the free recall conditions usually necessary to produce the reminiscence bump).  In order to explore the effect of critical age on memory distribution more closely, each dated memory was converted to an age relative to the participant-selected critical age for each I am. Thus all 480 memories were given either a positive score (occurring after critical age for the relevant identity statement) or a negative score (occurring before critical age for that identity statement), or 0 if they occurred in the same year as the critical age. Thus, for participant 10’s identity statement ‘I am adventurous’ which had a critical age of 15, their memory of travelling around Australia aged 22 would be reformulated as 7.  Figure 2 (upper panel) shows these data for all 480 memories.  These memories are distributed normally around zero: mean = 6.97, mode= 0, median= 4.5, skew= -.10, kurtosis= .75.
(Insert Figure 2 About Here)
     Figure 2 shows a clear centring of memories around the critical age of self image formation, with 0 (the year of critical age) having the highest number of memories (10% of all memories), and with 18% of all memories generated for the period between zero and two years after the formation of that self.  In addition, there are a greater number of memories generated after the emergence of the self than before it (66% versus 24%).
    Person-by-person analysis
    To analyse these data, they were split into twelve epochs: (-64 to -55, -54 to -45, -44 to -35, -34 to -25, -24 to -15, -14 to -5, -4 to 5, 6 to 15, 16 to 25, 26 to 35, 36 to 45, 46 to 54).  The data for each participant was then recoded as the proportion of memories that fell into each epoch. Table 1 (upper panel) shows this data.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
    A repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of epoch, F(11,165) = 35.74, MSE= .006, p <.001.  This shows that people generated significantly more memories for some epochs than others.  Tests of between subjects factors revealed no significant effects of age or gender (F<1). Pairwise comparisons were made comparing the 12 epochs with each other using Bonferroni corrected t-tests.   Crucially, in the central epoch (-4 to 5 years either side of the emergence of the particular self image), participants generated significantly more memories (mean number of memories recalled = 12) than for ten of the other epochs (p.<.05, corrected).  
    Thus far, the data show that when generating autobiographical memories to a self image, people are very much more likely to sample from the period of life close to the time at which they judge that that self emerged.  What is striking about this data is that no clear lifespan retrieval curve emerged: by using I am statements as cues, we collected a set of memories that are undeniably connected to the self, but nonetheless, do not produce the standard reminiscence bump.  Moreover, people are generating memories to their own idiosyncratic selves, and according to those which they feel most define themselves.
    We were further motivated to consider the nature of the selves generated to examine whether that had any bearing on the number of memories generated by critical age.  It is standard to split these I am statements into concrete ‘consensual’ and abstract ‘subconsensual’ roles, based on the coding system used by Kuhn and McPartland (1954).  Thus, the three identity statements used by the participant were coded dichotomously as ‘abstract’ or ‘concrete’ identities; abstract denoting a statement without consensual group meaning such as an attribute or trait (eg. ‘I am ambitious,’ ‘I am lacking in self confidence,’ ‘I am outspoken,’) and concrete denoting a statement that is non-ambiguous and whose conditions of membership are common knowledge (eg. ‘I am a Christian,’ ‘I am a wife,’ ‘I am an only child’).   We were interested in whether the self-centred distribution of memories held for both sets of selves.  In particular, we envisaged that memories of concrete of selves would centre on the formation of that self, e.g. memories of the wedding for ‘I am a husband.’ However, a more stringent test of our theory would be whether even abstract self cued memories would centre around the formation of that self, where there is no concrete start point, assumption of role, or public event.  
(Insert Figure 3 about here)
    Thus, the I am statements were all divided into abstract (producing 28 statements) or concrete (producing 20 statements).  The mean age for memories generated from concrete identity statements was 25.9 years and 19.7 for abstract identity statements.  Figure 3 (upper panel) shows these data.  This graph shows that the two sets of selves have overlapping functions, and both produce the highest number of memories for the central zero years.   Because half of the sample elected to generate memories from three selves that were either all concrete or all abstract, it was not possible to analyse this formally in a person-by-person approach. 
    Finally, we checked that the age of the memories was not distributed purely according to temporal associations between adjacent memories.  When participants are given a free rein to generate memories in AM tasks, it is known that, all other things being equal, participants tend to prime themselves, such that any two memories generated sequentially are very likely to come from the same time period.  To ensure that participants were not self-priming subsequent memories in this manner, an analysis was carried out on the distribution of ages for adjacent memories.  Results showed that only 36% of memory ages were from within two years of the previous memory.  Additionally, as mentioned above, the critical age for each identity was asked for at the end of the questionnaire, which ensured that no priming occurred from the stated age of self image formation.  Thus, the distribution of memories seems to be driven by self and personality constructs, not mere temporal grouping based on cognitive concepts like priming.
    The methods of analysis used above reflect a traditional person-by-person approach to analysing memory distributions. However, an alternative method is to carry out an item-by-item analysis, comparing all dated memories across participants. In this manner, a more thorough investigation of the differences between abstract and concrete-cued memories can be achieved.
    Item-by-item analysis
    There were 280 memories cued by concrete selves, and 200 cued by abstract selves. Table 2 (upper panel) shows the data on the distributions of these memories. The higher kurtosis value reflects the more tightly clustered distribution of concrete-cued memories. A 12-epoch analysis of the item-by-item memories showed that 44% of all concrete memories came from central epoch (-4 to 5), compared to 31% of abstract cued memories. 
(Insert Table 2 about here)
     In order to assess whether there was any statistically significant difference between the skew and kurtosis values of abstract and concrete cued memories, two t-tests were conducted using the kurtosis and skew statistics for each group. In essence, this analysis is the same as considering the difference in means between two samples on the basis of the distribution, but instead of the mean and the standard error of the mean, this analysis considers the value and standard error of skew and kurtosis in turn.​[1]​ The differences in skew were not significant (t=.72, p> .05), nor were the kurtosis scores (t=-1.45, p>.05).  Analysis of frequency of memories in each epoch by concrete and abstract cue revealed no significant differences (X2 (10) = 15.464, p=.116).   Figure 3 (upper panel) shows overlapping distributions for abstract and concrete selves, supported by this non-significant difference in distributions. 
    To summarise, Study 1 showed that autobiographical memories tend to cluster around the time of self formation. The motivation for Study 2 was to replicate this finding, and address a number of methodological and theoretical issues.  When given the opportunity to generate self concepts and identities which are reflective of the self, people tend to generate memories from when that self identity was formed.  This suggests that each individual self concept is supported by a distribution of separate self defining memories, and that those memories are most accessible for the period at which the self emerged.  This is a novel finding, since it demonstrates separate ‘reminiscence bumps’ centred on particular aspects of self, and represents a novel means of generating memories that are related to important concepts and traits.  Given its novelty, and the small sample size, it seemed important to replicate these findings in a separate, larger sample.
Study 2
    The approach for Study 2 is similar to that described above, but in order to replicate the study with a larger sample size, the questionnaire was converted into an online study. 
    Method
    Participants
    There were 59 participants (sixteen male) of mean age 53.95 years (range: 39 to 76).  All were accessed either via email or through psychology questionnaire websites.​[2]​ 
    Materials and Procedure
    Participants completed the online questionnaire which was very similar in format to that used in Study 1. In Study 2, retrospective dating of all memories was carried out, instead of the concurrent dating used in Study 1. The dating of memories occurred after all four sections of memory title generation had been completed, so as to avoid potential cueing of future memories by the dating process. Similarly, participants were only asked to report the age they were when each ‘I am’ became self-defining after all memory titles and dates had been generated (rather than after each ‘I am’ section as in Study one). 
    In addition, participants were asked to generate eight memories for four separate ‘I am’ statements, in order to examine potential clustering across a wider range of selves per participant, and to facilitate the analysis of concrete and abstract selves. 
    Results and Discussion
    In total, 1818 memories were collected, with each participant giving an average of 31 memories each. Figure 1 (lower panel) shows the distribution of these memories across the lifespan, and replicates our previous finding. When memories are cued by identity statements, they do not produce the typical lifespan retrieval curve reminiscence bump. 
    Person-by-person analysis
    Following procedure, all participants gave an age at which each of their ‘I am’ statements became a defining part of their identity: their critical age. The mean critical age was 25.1 years of age (SD=14.8), slightly later than that of the first sample. An independent samples t-test was carried out on the distributions of critical ages in Studies 1 and 2, which revealed no significant differences [t(282) = -.94, p=.35]. To investigate whether memories collected clustered around times of identity formation, all memories were again recoded as number of years before or after their associated identity statement. The overall mean for this data was 8.85, mode= 0, median= 6, skew= .002, kurtosis= .68. The recoded memories were then divided into the 12 epochs described previously. Figure 2 (lower panel) demonstrates that the central epoch (between 4 years prior to critical age and 5 years after) is the time from which most memories are recalled (36% of all memories). Twelve percent of all memories given came from year zero- the year participants felt defined the formation of each identity. A clustering pattern identical to that found in the previous study is shown, with memory numbers decreasing as years from critical age increases. Again, excluding those given at year zero, more memories are recalled from years after formation of self than before (1288 versus 344). 
    A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the 12 epochs. Again, the memories were recoded as proportional epoch data for each participant. Table 1 (lower panel) shows the mean proportion of memories in each epoch. There was a significant effect of epoch F(3.57, 206.96)=86.29, MSE= .008, p<.000. Pairwise comparisons showed the most central epoch (-4 to +5) to have a significantly higher mean proportion of memories compared to all other epochs (p.<001, corrected). In order to examine the frequencies of concrete and abstract cued memories around time of self formation, memories were again plotted as years before and after critical age. Figure 3 (lower panel) shows that, again, concrete and abstract selves cue similar patterns of retrieval. However, the larger sample size in Study 2 allows a more in depth analysis of concrete and abstract distributions using an item-by-item approach.
    Study 2 is thus far an exact replication of the pattern found in Study 1; people have a strong tendency to selectively sample memories about aspects of their identity from around the time in their lives when that identity was formed. The spread of memories, as in the previous study, does not show the traditional reminiscence bump shape, but reveals instead a tight clustering of autobiographical memories around emergence of selves. 
    Item-by-item analysis
    Following the analysis of memories cued by abstract and concrete selves in Study 1, this larger sample was used to carry out an item by item analysis of each of the 1818 individual memories. Memories were coded as number of years before or after emergence of their associated self, and were marked as concrete or abstract in accordance with that self. Table 2 (lower panel) illustrates the descriptive details of the abstract and concrete cued memories.
    Although the means are similar for both types of identity, the differences in skewness and kurtosis statistics were of interest as they reflect differences in the shapes of distributions of memories cued by different selves. As before, in order to assess whether these differences were of statistical significance, two t-tests were conducted using the kurtosis and skew statistics for each group.  In this study, the differences in skew were significant at the .05 level [t(1816)=2.35, p<.05]. However, although the skews of the two distributions differ, both are very small – with values less than one (see Table 2).  The pattern is such that the abstract selves seem to have a slightly longer tail.  The differences between the kurtosis scores were also shown to be significant at the .05 level [t(1816)=-6.45, p<.05], such that the memories cued by a concrete self produce a significantly more peaked distribution than those cued by an abstract self.  Interestingly, whereas difference reached significance in Study 2, the mean values are in the same range as Study 1.  On the whole, concrete selves produce a more peaked normal distribution with more memories in the central range, and a shorter, less negative skew.  Although there are significant differences in the skew values, it should be noted that the actual values are not substantially different from zero.  A standard normal distribution has a kurtosis of zero, and any value greater than this indicates a greater central tendency represented as a high clustering around the mean.  Thus, all memories seem to cluster around the central point – the critical age of self formation, and interestingly, if anything, this is more pronounced with the concrete selves.  These slight differences in distribution are supported by a chi squared test, which revealed significant differences in frequencies of memories in each epoch between concrete and abstract selves [X2 (11)= 224.85,  , p<.001].
    It is possible that this is due to the types of events that are recalled in association with concrete selves. For example, ‘I am a mother’ or ‘I am a husband’ are both very likely to cue memories of significant events around the time of identity formation (childbirth, weddings, etc.). Conversely, it is less likely that abstract identities (often personality traits) would be linked to such defined events, and may be grounded by more temporally dispersed examples of being ‘happy’ or ‘intelligent.’ 
    Overall however, despite the apparent differences in retrieval distributions for concrete and abstract selves, the basic pattern of results remains the same. Regardless of the type of identity used as a cue, memories tend to cluster tightly around times of identity formation. The standard person-by-person approach to analysing memory distributions has been used in conjunction with a new method of analysis. The item-by-item approach enables novel methods of analysis to be used, such as statistical comparisons of kurtosis and skew statistics. These methods allow a closer examination of the nature of autobiographical retrieval related to different aspects of identity, and we recommend their continued use in the field of autobiographical memory.  Ultimately, evidence from the two means of analysis (by participants or by memories) converge on the same finding: memories cluster around times of identity formation.
Follow-up
    The design of studies 1 and 2 (with age of self emergence generated after memory retrieval) ensured participants were not priming their memories ages with age of identity emergence. However, it is possible that their generated age of self formation was partly primed by the memories given in the study. To account for this possibility, and to explore the permanence of age of self formation, 10 of the 16 participants from Study 1 took part in a follow-up study. In this follow-up, which took place four years after participation in Study 1, participants were asked to generate an age of self image formation for the three I am statements they had used as memories cues in Study 1. They were also provided with the remaining seven of their initial ten I am statements, which were randomly mixed with seven I am statements from a yoked, gender-matched participant. The difference between ages of self formation for each I am at time 1 and time 2 was calculated as a difference score. A one sample t test found that this difference score did not differ significantly from zero [t(29) = 0,  p = 1]. This indicates that memories did not act as primes for age of self formation in studies 1 and 2, and that these ages are relatively stable over time. Additional analysis on the correct identification of participants’ identity statements used a calculation of hits minus false positives. A one sample t test showed that participants were significantly better than chance at recognising their identity statements given four years previously [t(9) = 7.915,   p< .001], providing further indication of the enduring nature of the I am statements used in this methodological approach.
General Discussion
    In these studies we asked participants to produce I am statements that were reflective of their self images (after Kuhn & McPartland, 1954).  We found that participants were able to generate memories from their own life that were related to these memories, and were mostly normally distributed around the age at which they felt that self emerged.  Results suggest that each self image might serve an organisational function within autobiographical memory, and that activation of a particular self image leads to the activation of a network of memories for specific events associated with that self.
    Our methodology, which examines how memories are temporally organised with regards to separate self images, suggests that autobiographical memories cluster around times of self image formation, rather than simply being generated in higher numbers for certain life-time periods such as adolescence.   We argue that the standard reminiscence bump is most plausibly due to the clustering of memories around several self-images that are crucial to the self. In fact, in our study, where people are cued by separate I am statements, the standard reminiscence bump was not found.  If autobiographical memories do distribute purely as a function of age, then it would be expected that we would find a prominent peaking of reminiscence around 10 to 30 years of age, despite the self cues we used.   
    Further support for our hypothesis, that identity formation is a more informative factor than age concerning autobiographical memory distributions, was found in the comparison between proportions of memories from concrete and abstract identity statements. Both concrete selves and abstract selves affect autobiographical memory generation in a similar fashion, although item-by-item analysis in the larger sample revealed subtle differences in the nature of the memory distributions. This is very interesting, as abstract identities (eg. ‘I am popular’) tie in more closely with Singer’s self-defining memory research (Singer & Blagov, 2001) concerning times of formation of personality traits and other more abstract self-concepts, whereas concrete identities are more linked with specific life events such as marriage (‘I am a wife,’) and starting a job (‘I am a pilot’).   Further research should address the accessibility of concrete and abstract selves in a design which all participants generate memories for both.  Since self-defining memories are an important concept in neurological and psychiatric populations, we also suggest that this method might be appropriate for generating personally relevant memories and memories of critical periods in lifespan development. Futhermore, as both self and autobiographical memory are implicated in clinical depression (Barry, Naus and Rehm, 2006; Lemogne, Piolino, Friszer, et al., 2006), research could focus on the distributions of memories cued by positive and negative statements. Rubin and Berntsen (2003) found that reminiscence bumps were only generated for highly positive events, not for negative events. Preliminary analysis of the data in this study revealed too few negative statements to carry out a formal analysis; however, tasks in which participants are asked to generate memories for positive and negative selves warrant further investigation.
    This research converges on a few critical ideas in the autobiographical memory literature.  First, we have demonstrated the nature of the relations between self and memory: memories of one’s life seem to converge on periods of new self image formation (e.g. Conway, 2005).  Further, it seems that the reminiscence bump occurs as a result of formation of adult identity (Conway, 1996), the novelty of events that follow, and ultimately the period of stability that adult identity formation results in (Rubin, Rahhal & Poon, 1998).  Here we suggest that a reminiscence bump is formed at any point where one generates a new self image as supported by the results of Conway & Haque’s (1999) study in which Bangladeshi participants generated a second reminiscence bump at the time of great national upheaval.  Finally, as suggested by Fitzgerald (1988), and Singer and Salovey (1993), it seems that the key to the reminiscence bump could be that memories from this time are concerned with self-defining experiences. Conway, Singer and Tagini (2004) proposed a cognitive model incorporating self-defining memories into Conway’s model of autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and it appears the results obtained in the present study would support such a combined model. Further, we suggest that the self images produced by ‘I am’ statements could be the socially constructed categories and ‘self structures’ that Conway, Singer and Tagini (2004) suggest form the conceptual self- an aspect of the self memory system that is both constrained by, and is capable of altering the autobiographical knowledge base. The selves participants generated reflect only a few of the many self images that together help form a person’s identity. Naturally, these selves might have been chosen as a result of particular current concerns and motivations, but the follow-up data suggests that these identities are clearly recognisable after several years, and that the age at which they are judged to emerge is stable. This emerging idea warrants further investigation to elucidate the memory mechanisms which support narrative accounts of identity.  We suggest that the novel methodology adopted here would be ideal for this purpose, insofar as we can directly probe aspects of self and personality within a well constrained memory task. 
    Finally, whilst this paper proposes a model in which autobiographical memories are closely associated with-and organised by-semantic self knowledge, it is noted that other theorists have proposed a dissociation between these concepts. Neuropsychological evidence from a case of amnesia, in which semantic self knowledge was accessed in the absence of episodic memory, suggests that the self can be known without a network of associated memories to support it (Klein, Cosmides, Costabile and Mei, 2002). However, the same authors report a case of autism in which the participant had verifiable knowledge of his own identity traits, but had severely impaired semantic knowledge of other non-self semantic facts (e.g. animals). Klein et al. (2002) conclude that the self does appear to have a special role as structure in memory, and what we would propose is that even if semantic trait knowledge and autobiographical memory are dissociable, our data suggests that in most cases these two function in a bi-directionally supportive role. 
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